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EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,246 AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO TITLE VII: THE
ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN BONA
FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEMS
As economic conditions have become less predictable and collec-
tive bargaining agreements have grown more sophisticated, workers'
seniority provisions' have emerged as crucial employment terms.
Probably more than any other labor provision, seniority rights affect
the economic security of individual employees.' Hence, the incidence
of unlawful discrimination in seniority agreements has increasingly
commanded the attention of the courts, Congress and legal commenta-
tors.3
However, the ability of the judiciary to relieve discrimination re-
sulting from seniority agreements remains uncertain.4 Unquestionably,
seniority provisions that are framed with an intent to discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin are illegal under
section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 But the
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirementsfor Government Contract Work, 63
COLuM. L. Rav. 243 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Speck];
Comment, The Philadelphia Plao A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment].
I. A "seniority system" may be defined as a set of rules governing job mobility in an em-
ployment unit, including such features as promotion, demotion, transfer and layoff. For a more
complete definition, see Note, Title VII, Semority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (1967).
2. Collective bargaining agreements usually contain a "last hired, first fired" clause provid-
ing that employees with the least seniority be laid off first. See Note, Last Hired, First Fired
Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544 (1975). Moreover, due to recent economic condi-
tions, many employers who had only recently hired significant numbers of minority employees
have been forced to lay off workers. See id. 1544. See generaly Aaron, Reflections on the Legal
Nature and Enforceability fSeniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962).
3. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976); Note, supra note 1.
4. Section 703(h) of Title VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)) and Executive
Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. following § 2000e
(1976), create two variant standards. The statute allows "bona fide" seniority systems, while the
order makes illegal any discrimination, regardless of the "bona fide" nature of the system.
5. Section 703(h) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or dif-
ferent terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production
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meaning of section 703(h) becomes more ambiguous in view of its dec-
laration that "bona fide seniority systems" are not unlawful.6 Resolv-
ing a conflict in circuit court interpretations of this language, the
Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States7 finally established the scope of seniority rights under the Act:
seniority agreements that are neutral on their face and in intent will not
be struck down, in spite of any discriminatory effects.' Moreover, the
Court held that a system which tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimina-
tion can still be "bona fide" and thus permissible under Title VII.
Notwithstanding the Teamsters decision, a new theory for relief
from discriminatory employment terms, based upon Executive Order
No. 11,246,9 has recently been argued in the lower federal courts.10
The executive order demands that federal contractors and subcontrac-
tors take affirmative action to ensure that no employment discrimina-
tion exists in such areas as "upgrading, demotion, or transfer; ...
layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation
.. ..1 This controversial order has been widely used for many years
to direct affirmative action programs by employers.12 Only recently,
however, have the courts considered whether it may also be used to
augment the relief provided under Title VII.
In United States v. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.,' 3 the
government argued before the Fifth Circuit that seniority provisions in
union collective bargaining agreements violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act as well as certain obligations imposed by Executive Order
No. 11,246. The defendant company employed two types of truck-
or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .....
6. Id.
7. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). For a discussion of this case, see Young, Supreme Court Report, 63
A.B.A.J. 1126, 1126-28 (1977).
8. 431 U.S. at 349-50.
9. 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. following § 2 000e (1976).
10. See United States v. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977). The
court noted that the argument that "obligations on government contractors under the executive
order are 'above and beyond' those imposed. . . by Title VII" was one never made until after the
Teamsters decision. Id. at 185.
11. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(a), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976). For a general overview of the order, see Lopatka, 4 1977Primer
on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 121-25.
12. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Af-
firmative action plans promulgated by the courts are part of the courts' power and duty to elimi-
nate the vestiges of past discrimination"); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (holding the Philadelphia Plan, see note 59
infra, a constitutional exercise of presidential power).
13. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
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drivers: over-the-road (OTR) drivers, who drove between different cit-
ies, and city drivers, who were confined to one terminal. The
government sued both the employer and the union, contending that
minorities had been systematically excluded from the better and
higher-paying OTR jobs. Furthermore, once an employee was allowed
to transfer from a city to an OTR route he was prevented from carrying
the seniority he had gained in his previous job to the OTR position. It
was thus argued that the seniority provisions of the union agreements
perpetuated the prior discrimination by discouraging transfers to the
better jobs. 14
The Fifth Circuit held, on the authority of Teamsters, that the
agreement was bona fide under section 703(h), since the seniority pro-
visions were neutral on their face. Deciding further that no relief could
be granted for pre-Act discrimination, the court remanded the question
of relief for post-Act discrimination to the district court. Dismissing
the applicability of Executive Order No. 11,246, the circuit court held
that the union was not a proper party under the executive order; that
the executive order required that judicial proceedings against the union
be brought under Title VII, which covers only "intentional post-Act"
discrimination, and not under the order; and that the executive order
lacked the force of law to the extent that it goes beyond the mandate of
Title VII.'5
The court's decision suggests a basic misreading of the background
and intent of both the statute and the executive order. It ascribes clar-
ity to the ambiguous legislative history of Title VII and disregards the
strength of an executive order program that has been employed for al-
most forty years. Mistakenly, the court broadened the purview of the
Act and narrowed that of the order, thus manufacturing an exclusive
remedy which neither Congress, the courts nor the executive branch
contemplated. This Note will focus upon the use of Executive Order
No. 11,246 as a means of unfreezing the discriminatory effects of"bona
fide" seniority systems. It will analyze the presidential authority to is-
sue the order and the congressional acquiescence which allows such
executive action. The Note will conclude that since congressional ap-
proval has been manifest, Executive Order No. 11,246 can provide an
effective remedy reaching beyond Title VII.
14. Id. at 182.
15. Id. at 184-85.
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I. EXECUTiVE ORDER No. 11,246
A. History and Scope.
The executive order program prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion by government contractors has been in effect since World War II.16
In 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8,80217 which
required the insertion of clauses barring employment discrimination by
the contractor on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin into
all defense contracts. A series of similar executive orders was issued
during the presidential terms of Roosevelt and Truman, all based upon
the executive's war powers. 8 President Eisenhower's executive orders
broadened the contract compliance programs and separated them from
the President's power over defense production. 19 Although originally
the required clause only obligated a contractor to practice nondiscrimi-
nation, executive orders since 1961 have required a provision directing
contractors to undertake "affirmative action" to ensure equal job op-
portunity.20 President Johnson's Executive Order No. 11,246 continued
this affirmative action requirement and transferred compliance over-
sight to the Secretary of Labor.
Since the federal government does business with virtually all ma-
jor companies in the United States, the scope of Executive Order No.
16. In 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943
Compilation), which established the Fair Employment Practice Committee. Two years later, Ex-
ecutive Order No. 9,346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation), expanded the powers of the
Committee and directed that a broader nondiscrimination requirement be attached to all govern-
ment contracts. See Hebert & Reischel, Title VII and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Em-
ployment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449,451-52 (1971). See generally Chicago Comment
725-26.
17. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation).
18. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-1953 Compilation) (creating the
Committee of Government Contract Compliance). See generally Chicago Comment 725-26. The
source of the President's war powers is article II, section 2, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which
makes the President commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
19. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971). The court observed that in President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10,479, 3
C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953 Compilation), there was for the first time "no mention of defense produc-
tion." 442 F.2d at 170. The order authorized the Committee on Government Contract Compli-
ance to conduct activities not directly related to federal procurement.
20. President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation),
created the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and instituted a procedure
whereby government contractors were to submit plans for the elimination of discrimination, in-
cluding affirmative recruitment, hiring and promotion efforts. See Hebert & Reischel, supra note
16, at 452-53. See generally Note, Executive Order 11246: -Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Gov-
ernment Contracts, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 590 (1969).
21. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976).
Prior to this executive order, compliance functions had been delegated to the President's Commit-
tee on Equal Employment Opportunity created during the Kennedy administration. See Note,
supra note 20, at 593.
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11,246 is extensive. In 1971, it was estimated that the government ex-
pended $70 billion annually in the procurement of its necessities.22
These government contracts involve approximately one-third of the
country's work force.23 Executive orders have been justified as an ap-
propriate exercise of the procurement power; one commentator sug-
gests that the nondiscrimination clause is warranted by the tremendous
value of government contracts, the large number of employees affected
and the source of the funds used.24
B. The Executive's Authority to Issue Executive Order No. 11,246.
The chief executive's general authority to issue procurement rules
flows from the mandate in article II, section 3 of the United States Con-
stitution that "the President shall take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" and from article II, section 1, which provides that "executive
power shall be vested in the President." Executive Order No. 11,246
implements section 205 of the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949.25 Congress, through section 205, explicitly
granted the President authority "to prescribe such policies and direc-
tives . . . as he shall deem necessary to effectuate"26 an "economical
and efficient system for the procurement and supply' 27 of government
property and services. Courts have drawn from the authority of the
procurement statutes the power of the executive "to achieve social and
economic objectives only indirectly related to conventional procure-
ment considerations. 28 In Contractors Association of Eastern Penn-
22. Hebert & Reischel, supra note 16, at 455.
23. See Note, supra note 20, at 591-92.
24. Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REv. 837, 866-
67 (1957). The government justifies use of the clause by arguing that a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion will make more effective use of the work force by ensuring minority employment and that the
government must set an example for contractors. Id. 867. Professor St. Antoine lends support to
these positions, asserting that "the whole of our society should be enriched by the opening up of a
vast new spectrum of job opportunities for large segments of the population that were previously
excluded." St. Antoine, Affirmative Action: Hypocritical Euphemism or Noble Mandate?, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 28, 42 (1976).
25. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1976).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 471.
28. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18 (7th Cir. 1975). In
Northeast Coastr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court stated:
Congress and the President have increasingly had recourse to the procurement power for
nonprocurement objectives, as "a device for the accomplishment, implementation, or
even formulation of important national policies and goals, as a sophisticated technique
for public administration as well as procurement .... [sic] conditioning the award or
the terms of government procurement contracts in order to promote national social or
economic standards or goals that in themselves had no immediate relevance to supplying
the particular procurement need."
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sylvania v. Secretary of Labor,29 the court noted that "it is in the
interest of the United States in all procurement to see that its suppliers
are not in the long run increasing its costs and delaying its programs by
excluding from the labor pool available minority workmen. ' 30 Other
authorities point similarly to the notion that the antidiscrimination pro-
visions of the executive order are related "to the establishment of 'an
economical and efficient system for. . . the procurement and supply'
of property and services. ... 31 But despite the many cases support-
ing the nondiscrimination clause and holding that the executive order
has the force and effect of law, if a provision of the order violates any
expression of congressional intent-as in the area of discriminatory se-
niority terms-such a provision will not be sustained.32
The Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer33
held that the President may not act in contravention of a stated legisla-
tive policy. 4 The Court struck down as unconstitutional President
Truman's executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate the nation's steel mills. Justice Jackson delineated the
scope of executive power in his concurring opinion: when the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at a maximum; in the absence of either a grant or a denial
of authority, the President can only rely upon his own independent
powers; and when the President takes measures that are incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb. The second source of presidential power that Justice Jackson out-
lined is quite abstract and, hence, is the most difficult of the three to
characterize and understand. Nevertheless, since many executive ac-
Id. at 760 (footnote omitted) (quoting Levanthal, Public Contracts and Administrative Law, 52
A.B.A.J. 35, 36-37 (1966)).
29. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
30. 442 F.2d at 170.
31. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967) (quoting 40 U.S.C.A. § 471); see Pasley, supra note 24, at 866-68. See generally
Leventhal, supra note 28, at 35-38; see also Speck 248-49 and authorities cited therein ("several
Presidents by executive order have prescribed use of procurement contract clauses to achieve other
objectives," id. 248).
32. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 720 (1979)
("executive orders may not override congressional expressions").
33. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For a discussion of the Youngstown case, see 1 A. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 226-27 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
34. 343 U.S. at 602; see id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Before this decision, the Court
had interpreted article II, section I of the United States Constitution as vesting an almost un-
bounded set of "inherent" powers in the President. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
35. 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tions are carried out in the absence of congressional authorization, it is
a power source crucial to the executive function. 6
Justice Jackson characterized this second area as a "zone of twi-
light" where both Congress and the President may possess concurrent
authority.3 7 Under such circumstances, "Congressional inertia, indif-
ference, or quiescence may. . . enable [or]. . . invite measures on in-
dependent presidential responsibility.""8 The "independent powers"
Justice Jackson referred to in his second category are more the product
of passive congressional acceptance than the subject of constitutional or
statutory delegation. Still, the Jackson opinion only speaks to the legiti-
macy, not to the initial source, of the power exercised. Where, then,
lies the origin of the executive authority before congressional acquies-
cence?
Two theories may be advanced to explain how an otherwise un-
delegated executive power comes into being. One possibility is that ref-
erence to "independent powers" in Justice Jackson's second category
may imply that the executive power vested in the President by article
II, section 1 of the Constitution represents an affirmative delegation of
some pervasive independent power, not at all statutorily based, and
thus not subject to congressional invalidation. 39 In such a case, the au-
thority of the executive to issue the executive order would be unques-
tioned.4°
Alternatively, the executive power in this area, although constitu-
tionally based, may be "elastic" in that it can expand where the Presi-
dent in the exercise of his executive function needs to fill a void left by
congressional inaction. 41 However, this power must correspondingly
contract when Congress has exercised its authority in the area or ex-
pressed a contrary intent.42 This view comports with Justice Frank-
36. Very few cases have been decided in this area. As one commentator observed shortly
after the Youngstown decision, "[n]early every case concerning executive encroachment [of legisla-
tive powers] has involved an unconstitutional delegation of power, not an outright usurpation."
Note, The Steel Seizure Cases, 41 Gao. L.J. 45, 62 (1952).
37. 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. See Note, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, 17 VILL. L. REV.
688, 694 (1972). See also Speck 244.
40. See Note, supra note 39, at 711 (whenever a President claims to act under his independ-
ent powers "the Supreme Court has been very reluctant to limit or invalidate such action").
41. See Speck 245; Note, supra note 39, at 699-701.
42. As one commentator contends in reference to Youngstown, "[in the most significant case
striking down a presidential exercise of power, the Court indicated that it may have upheld the
exercise had it not been for the previously expressed congressional disfavor toward such action."
Note, supra note 39, at 711-12; see Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For
a practical example of the executive's "elastic" authority, see Speck 245 ("it can be said that the
President in ordering a nondiscrimination clause is acting neither pursuant to an express or im-
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furter's observations in Youngstown:
In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged
in by Presidents ... making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on "execu-
tive power" vested in the President by § 1 of Article I. 4 3
Hence, an executive order may be promulgated without specific legal
authority to do so, but may become sanctioned by the very fact that
Congress did not invalidate it.4
United States v. Midwest Oil," a case decided before Youngstown,
illustrates this concept of implied executive authority.4 6  There, al-
though no statute explicitly authorized President Taft's action,47 the
Supreme Court upheld his withdrawal of a large tract of land from
public entry because such withdrawals had been undertaken for the
previous eighty years with no congressional attempt to repudiate the
assertion of presidential power.48 This lengthy period of legislative ac-
quiescence served "as a gloss on 'executive power' vested in the Presi-
dent by § 1 of Art. II.' 49 It is uncertain whether the outcome would
have been the same had the practice been challenged after only five,
instead of eighty, years; presumably, the President's action would not
plied authorization of Congress nor contrary to any express or implied declaration of Congress
but instead seems to be acting in 'a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concur-
rent authority'" (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
43. 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. This implies that an unapproved executive action could be struck down if attempts to
invalidate it were made soon after its implementation, but that it could "mature" into authorita-
tive law if no challenge were made and if Congress did not act. See Note, supra note 39, at 701;
cf. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) ("the long continued practice,
known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the withdrawals [of
land] had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized administrative power of the
Executive in the management of the public lands"). But see Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: The
President and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REv. 141, 181 (1952) ("The burden should not be
placed on Congress to take positive steps to negate an overreaching in the assertion of executive
authority").
45. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
46. For a very useful analysis of the distinctions between the character of executive authority
exerted in Midwest Oil and Youngstown, see Kauper, supra note 44, at 165. See also Note, supra
note 36, at 60-61.
47. 236 U.S. at 469 (President acted "without express statutory authority-but under claim of
power so to do").
48. Id. at 482-83. See also Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) ("Such a history of admin-
istrative construction [of the Immigration and Nationality Act] and congressional acquiescence
may add a gloss or qualification to what is on its face unqualified statutory language"); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) ("Congress' failure to repeal or revise in the face of such administra-
tive interpretation has been held to constitute persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the
one intended by Congress").
49. 343 U.S. at 610-11.
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have been upheld." For this type of implied executive power to arise,
there must be a period during which the acquiescence has an opportu-
nity to develop.51 The determinative question in each case is whether
the period of time over which the President has acted has been suffi-
ciently long for the court to conclude that congressional acquiescence
may be implied.
Even when the President acts in reliance upon a statute, his au-
thority may be called into question when his action is not reasonably
related to the "authorizing" statute. 2 In such instances, the executive
action in issue was neither clearly contemplated nor directly sanctioned
by Congress. For example, the ability of the President to relieve em-
ployment discrimination is not addressed by any statute. However, the
President may determine that the procurement statutes give him the
power to require employers to adopt affirmative action plans. The the-
ory supporting this exercise of power is that subsequent congressional
inaction on the questioned executive authority-in this case, the power
to require affirmative action schemes-may represent legislative acqui-
escence in the executive view, notwithstanding that the President ini-
tially lacked an unambiguous statutory foundation. Through its silence,
Congress further explains how it intended the statute to operate, partic-
ularly in regard to the executive function. 3 As in the case where the
executive had no statute from which his authority was derived, a lack
of congressional acquiescence would undermine such executive
power.54
Determining whether the executive order draws its authority from
constitutional or statutory underpinnings is not the purpose of this
Note. Rather, it is sufficient to recognize that the source of the execu-
tive power, unless constitutionally based and completely independent
of the powers of Congress, may be undercut by a lack of tacit congres-
50. See note 44 supra.
51. Similarly, in Youngstown the President relied upon statutory silence. In that case, how-
ever, there was no demonstration of congressional acquiescence. On the contrary, only a short
time before the presidential order was issued Congress had rejected approval of the very means
that Truman used to seize the steel mills. 343 U.S. at 602.
52. It is not clear that the President's procurement authority supports his imposition of non-
discrimination policies upon government contractors. As one commentator notes, "[a]n objection
to the exercise of power may be that nondiscrimination in employment by contractors is not
clearly relevant to the Government's concern in contracting with them." Speck 250. Speck never-
theless cites numerous examples of executive orders issued by several Presidents prescribing the
use of procurement contract clauses to achieve other objectives, absent statutory authorization.
Id. 248.
53. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States
v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
54. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Corwin, The Steel
Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without a Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 61 (1952).
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sional approval or by contrary congressional expressions. For example,
congressional action disapproving President Truman's means of set-
tling a national labor dispute spelled defeat for his exercise of authority
in Youngstown. Disregarding the specific source from which Executive
Order No. 11,246 originated, if one is to rely upon the "independent
powers" of the executive the crucial question becomes whether con-
gressional disapproval has been manifested in a manner sufficient to
defeat the affirmative action requirements of the order.
Considering the limited language of the procurement statutes, it is
not readily apparent that the nondiscrimination clauses of Executive
Order No. 11,246 were enacted pursuant to the "express or implied au-
thorization of Congress." Consequently, one must look to the "in-
dependent power" source of the executive. One commentator argues
that the "lack of any serious challenge" to the exercise of procurement
authority "by four Presidents in nine executive orders over twenty
years" lends support to presidential power to prescribe nondiscrimina-
tion.55 Certainly this position coincides with Justice Frankfurter's anal-
ysis in Youngstown that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before ques-
tioned" gives rise to the valid exercise of executive authority.56 More-
over, before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was finally enacted, many
pieces of legislation aimed at eliminating employment discrimination
were presented to the Congress, but were never approved;5 7 such con-
gressional inaction could evidence approval of the executive order pro-
gram as well as disapproval of a more comprehensive scheme.58
55. Speck 246. The author goes on to point out that "prescription of contract clauses by
executive order is older and almost as common as prescription by statute," id. 249, and that "even
without statutory authorization several Presidents by executive order have prescribed use of pro-
curement contract clauses to achieve other objectives." Id. 248.
56. 343 U.S. at 610. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
57. See Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L.
REv. 27 (1955). Professor Miller notes that several antidiscrimination bills were introduced in the
83d Congress. Senator Ives of New York, for example, authored S. 1831, making discrimination
on the basis of race, religion, color or natural origin an unfair labor practice. Although this bill
and other similar ones purporting to relieve discrimination were not passed, executive orders ex-
isting at the time required employment practices that Congress refused to authorize through legis-
lation. It does not follow, however, that the failure to pass any of these bills evidenced legislative
dissatisfaction with the executive order programs. A cogent argument could be made that by not
rejecting the provisions of the order, Congress approved efforts to restrict government contractors,
while disfavoring broader relief measures.
58. Nevertheless, just as the failure of a bill to become law does not necessarily evidence
legislative dissatisfaction with similar, pre-existing programs of more limited scope than that pro-
posed, neither can such congressional defeat be used to demonstrate legislative approval or acqui-
escence. See note 96 infra. The premise advanced here, as discussed by Professor Miller, see note
57 supra, is that since during the late 1950s and early 1960s Congress did consider implementing a
comprehensive antidiscrimination employment scheme (similar to that eventually approved in the
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Finally, congressional acquiescence in the face of far-reaching affirma-
tive action plans implemented on the authority of Executive Order No.
11,246 implies that Congress has granted the President, in the words of
Justice Jackson, an "independent presidential responsibility" 9 to help
relieve discriminatory employment practices. The degree of this pre-
rogative, and whether it may be extended to the field of seniority rights,
can be determined only by an analysis of recent congressional expres-
sions concerning employment discrimination.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The most significant manifestation of congressional intent as to the
policies that should govern the elimination of employment discrimina-
tion lies in the debates and reports dealing with the Civil Rights Act of
196460 and subsequently enacted related legislation.6" Unfortunately,
there existed only one reference in Title VII as originally enacted to the
executive order program, 62 and that was inserted without the benefit of
debate or commentary. Moreover, Congress' intent in passing Title VII
is unclear,63 although later legislative expressions help to clarify Con-
gress' position.
A. The Civil Rights Debates of 1964.
Remarks and memoranda offered by legislators before section
703(h) was introduced suggest that Congress did not envision a senior-
ity provision that might endanger established seniority rights.r 4 Sena-
Civil Rights Act of 1964) and was aware of the executive order program, it assented to the policy
of holding government contractors to stricter antidiscrimination terms than other employers by
not stripping the executive of the power to dictate and enforce such terms.
59. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). The Philadelphia Plan, for in-
stance, was implemented pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,246. It required that employers
submit a statement of "goals" of minority employment together with their bids. These goals were
to fall within a range established by the government. It seems clear, however, that § 703j) of the
Civil Rights Act alone would not authorize such a scheme. The lack of legislative action empha-
sizes Congress' apparent respect for measures such as the Philadelphia Plan that were imple-
mented on the basis of "independent presidential responsibility." See Chicago Comment 747-50.
For a general explanation of the Philadelphia Plan, see Comment, The Philadephia Plan: Equal
Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROa. 187 (1970).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976).
61. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16 to
2000e-17 (1976)).
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1976)), reprinted inpart at note 94 infra. This provision relieved employers
who filed reports under Executive Order No. 11,246 from the requirement of filing additional
reports pursuant to Title VII. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.
63. See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra. See Note, supra note 1, at 1271.
64. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6563-64 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel) ("Neither would se-
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tor Clark, a floor manager of the bill and heralded as the "Senate Czar"
of the Act, stated that the bill "would not affect seniority at all.' 65 The
Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII written by Senators Clark and
Case further elaborated:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its ef-
fect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a busi-
ness has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-
white working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's
obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.66
The importance of this material has been widely questioned, however,
since the relevant debates and documents predate by many weeks the
Mansfield-Dirksen amendment containing section 703.67 As a result,
the term "bona fide seniority system" was never clarified. Similarly,
none of the legislative history of Title VII explicitly addresses the
problems of seniority systems that perpetuate discrimination.68
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Act.
The courts have been forced to fit a nebulous and perhaps contra-
dictory legislative directive into a complex matrix of employment vari-
ables. First, they had to define the meaning of "bona fide seniority
niority rights be affected by this act"). See generally Vaas, Title VI1- Legislative History, 7 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. Rav. 431, 448-49 (1966).
65. 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
66. Id. 7213.
67. See Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. La.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). Judge Cassibry observed in Watkins.
Some weeks after Senator Clark inserted his memoranda in the Record, a bipartisan
group of Senate leadership prepared another version of a Civil Rights Bill, including a
new fair employment title ... which was subsequently enacted .... In view of this
chronology, it seems proper to rely more heavily on the language of Section 703(h), and
less on the earlier legislative statements than might otherwise be appropriate in interpret-
ing the Act on questions of seniority.
369 F. Supp. at 1228. Although the Watkins decision was later reversed by the Fifth Circuit, 516
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975), the circuit court apparently accepted the district court's interpretation of
the legislative history of § 703(h), basing its reversal upon a factual error: "The district court had
no basis in fact for the decision that the Company's history of racial discrimination in hiring
makes it impossible for blacks to have sufficient seniority to withstand layoff. ... Id. at 46.
For a helpful consideration of the Fifth Circuit's modification of Judge Cassibry's opinion, see
Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MIcH. L. REV. I,
43-45 (1975).
68. One commentator has observed that
Congress did not, at any point in the debate or related hearings, directly confront the
problem of seniority systems in which discrimination had subordinated Negro workers
to whites of equal or lessor tenure. As the Clark-Case memorandum indicates, propo-
nents of Title VII concentrated on refuting charges that the bill authorized "reverse dis-
erimination" and that it would interfere with the normal operation of nondiscriminatory
seniority systems.
Note, supra note 1, at 1271.
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system," determining whether an agreement that was facially neutral
was "bona fide." Second, the courts had to examine the character of
relief that was warranted by the Act. Basically, there were three pos-
sibilities:69 first, retroactively erasing all vestiges of past discrimination
by elevating minorities and, accordingly, demoting other individuals as
if the discrimination had never existed; second, granting prospective
relief by allowing minority members to have elevated seniority status
corresponding to the amount of time they had spent in "minority
jobs";70 or, third, limiting the elevated seniority status of minorities to
the amount of time they had spent in "minority" jobs after the passage
of the Act. Another salient question was whether Congress had in-
tended a different result when the provisions involved "departmental,"
as opposed to "plant-wide," seniority.7 Finally, the courts were faced
with seemingly contradictory language within the Act itself. Section
716(a) declared a broad remedial policy, making unlawful any classifi-
cation of employees that would "tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. 72 The question remained whether the seniority area was
meant to be exempt from this sweeping mandate.
Before Teamsters, the virtually unanimous view of the courts was
that section 703(h) did not immunize seniority systems that perpetuated
the effects of prior discrimination, even discrimination resulting from
facially neutral programs.73 Referring to this judicial solidarity, Justice
Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Teamsters, ob-
served:
Without a single dissent, six Courts of Appeals have so held in over
30 cases, and two other Courts of Appeals have indicated their agree-
ment, also without dissent. In an unbroken line of cases, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has reached the same conclu-
69. For a more detailed analysis of these approaches, see Note, supra note 1, at 1268-75. The
writer refers to these categories respectively as (I) "freedom now," (2) "rightful place" and (3)
"status quo."
70. This solution would not displace nonminority workers, but would give the minority em-
ployee an advantage when new jobs became available. The term "minority" jobs refers to those
jobs traditionally held by minority employees.
71. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968) (court noted
that the legislative history contains no express statement about departmental seniority).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(1976).
73. See, e.g., Gibson v. Longshoremen, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Nance v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 953 (1977); Swint v. Pullman-
Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), remandedfor reconsideration in light of Team-
sters, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). See
authorities cited at Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 346 n.28.
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sion. And the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion is in ac-
cord.74
These decisions were premised on a variety of rationales. Some courts
simply questioned the applicability of the legislative history, stating
that the chronology of the Act's passage did not demonstrate that the
"bona fide" language was closely enough related to the earlier de-
bates75 or that the legislators' statements did not concern the particular
seniority system in question,76 such as departmental seniority. One
such court opined that a necessary "characteristic of a bonafide senior-
ity system must be lack of discrimination. '77 Other decisions suggested
that legislative history could be ignored in order to achieve the overrid-
ing intent of the Act.7" The test under this standard was "whether the
practices in question [had] any present discriminatory eect."'  From
such an analysis emerged the famous interpretation in Quarles v. Philp
Morris, Inc. 80 that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire genera-
tion of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed
before the Act."'" This position was later adopted by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 Still other courts accepted the
section 703(h) comments as useful congressional expressions, but con-
tended that these statements did not legalize seniority systems that per-
petuaf-d discrimination. 3 These courts apparently reasoned that
74. 431 U.S. at 378-80 (footnotes omitted). See authorities cited id. at 378 n.2, 379 n.3 & 380
nn.4-5.
75. See, e.g., Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La.
1974), rey'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
76. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). But Cf. Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 705 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976) ("Our reading of Title VII reveals no statutory proscription of plant-wide senior-
ity systems").
77. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 517 (E.D. Va. 1968) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
78. See Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. La.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. United States v. Jacksonville Termi-
nal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971) (a district court "is not limited to simply parroting the
Act's prohibitions but is required to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate."). See
also United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 169, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
79. United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 169, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (emphasis in original).
80. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
81. Id. at 516.
82. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
83. E.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976); Acha v. Beame, 531
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 384 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Had the Court objectively
examined the legislative history, it would have been compelled to reach the opposite conclusion")
(citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)).
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Congress did not intend to upset seniority expectations that had devel-
oped prior to the enactment of Title VII, but did mean to disturb such
expectations arising thereafter "to the extent that those expectations
were dependent upon whites benefiting from unlawful discrimina-
tion."'84 Finally, subsequent legislative actions manifested approval of
early court decisions liberally construing section 703(h), 5 affording an
even more substantial foundation for later decisions.86
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court reviewed its repeated holdings
that a prima facie Title VII violation could be established by practices
that are neutral in intent but nonetheless are de facto discriminatory.
Although the facially neutral practice in Teamsters, as in East Texas
Motor Freight, perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination, Justice
Stewart in the Court's majority opinion rejected the applicability of
Griggs with regard to "bona fide" seniority systems.17 Basing its deci-
sion upon the notion that the pre-section 703(h) congressional state-
ments were authoritative as to the purpose of Title VII, the Court
stated that section 703(h) did not condemn de facto discrimination left
frozen under existing seniority policies.88 The only remedy available,
according to the Court, was the awarding of retroactive seniority to
employees who sought relief from intentional post-Act discrimination,
expanding a policy earlier articulated in Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co.89 regarding hiring discrimination.9" Although the restrictive-
84. Teamsters, 424 U.S. at 484 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-I to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16 to
2000e-17 (1976).
86. E.g., United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Mar-
shall, 441 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1977). See generally 118 CoN'o. REc. 3371 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Williams) ("the courts have repeatedly proposed a multifaceted approach to employment
discrimination, to bring to bear the full force of the law on this problem. . . . The law against
employment discrimination did not begin with title VII and the EEOC, nor is it intended to end
with it"). Congress apparently agreed with the broad approach encouraged by the courts, for it
rejected attempts to make Title VII the exclusive remedy. See text accompanying notes 99-101
infra. See generally Chicago Comment 747-57.
87. 431 U.S. at 349. The Teamsters court stated that "[wiere it not for § 703(h), the seniority
system in this case would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale." Id. Griggs involved the re-
quirement of a high school diploma or passage of an intelligence test as a condition to employ-
ment in or transfer to jobs at a manufacturing plant. The decision did not, however, reach the
issue of discrimination arising from seniority practice.
88. Justice Stewart observed:
This disproportionate distribution of advantages does in a very real sense "operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices." But both the literal terms of §
703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered this
very effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them.
431 U.S. at 350.
89. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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ness that marks the Teamsters interpretation may be criticized, the
section 703(h) issue is now a settled question of law. Since the Court
dealt only with Title VII, however, and not with additional remedies, it
is unclear whether other laws may provide relief that cannot be
achieved under the Act.9'
C. Title VII-A Nonexclusive Remedy.
The courts have increasingly noted that "the remedies established
by Title VII are not exclusive. '92 Moreover, there is ample authority
that section 703(h) is a limitation only upon Title VII and not upon
other laws, including executive orders, that seek to relieve discrimina-
tion in seniority agreements.93 At least two cogent arguments exist for
this narrow construction of the Act. First, a reference to executive or-
ders in section 709(d) of the Civil Rights Act as originally enacted im-
plies that Congress intended that the executive order program would
continue in existence.94 The language of section 709(d) demonstrates
that Congress recognized the "requirements" of the order. Although
all reference to "executive orders" was deleted from this section by the
1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act,95 this later action repre-
90. 431 U.S. at 356. Justice Stewart correctly envisioned the crippling effect that this inter-
pretation would render upon seniority rights:
Where, because of the employer's prior intentional discrimination, the line drivers with
the longest tenure are without exception white, the advantages of the seniority system
flow disproportionately to them and away from Negro and Spanish surnamed employees
who might by now have enjoyed those advantages had not the employer discriminated
before the passage of the Act.
Id. at 349-50.
91. The obvious question is whether Title VII affects the relief outlined by Executive Order
No. 11,246. There are other statutory overlaps of Title VII, however. For instance, concern over
the relationship between Title VII and the remedies provided under the National Labor Relations
Act has been frequently expressed. See Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the
National Labor Relations Act: A New Role for the NLR9, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158 (1974).
92. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971); see EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978).
93. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 1110, 1121
(E.D. La. 1977). See generally St. Antoine, supra note 24, at 37-42.
94. Section 709(d) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1976) provided in pertinent
part:
Where an employer is required by Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961, or by
any other Executive order prescribing fair employment practices for Government con-
tractors and subcontractors,. . . to file reports relating to his employment practices with
any Federal agency or committee .... the Commission shall not require him to file
additional reports pursuant to ... this section.
95. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 6, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1976)).
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sented an effort to streamline the record keeping and reporting require-
ments of the Act, rather than a refusal to recognize the requirements of
the executive order programs. 96 In demanding reports on the achieve-
ment of those requirements by employers, Congress apparently as-
sented to the executive policy.97 Just as Congress had acquiesced in the
promulgation of earlier executive orders whose scope exceeded that of
contemporary antidiscrimination statutes by its failure to invalidate the
orders, the legislature similarly appears to have accepted in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 a stricter standard for federal contractors than for
other employers. Congress not only neglected to strike down Executive
Order No. 11,246, but also legitimated it by statutory reference, thus
evidencing an intent to render the Act a nonexclusive remedy.
Second, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title
VII, popularly known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972,98 erased doubts as to the legality of the executive order's liberal
remedial measures. A series of attempts to amend the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act sought to confine the authority of Executive Or-
der No. 11,246 within the bounds of Title VII.99 Legislative sentiment
in support of the executive order program surfaced in successful oppo-
sition to a renewed attempt to make Title VII the exclusive federal rem-
edy. Three amendments offered by Senator Ervin were defeated: °°
first, to merge the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), cre-
ating an agency that derived its power solely from Title VII; second,
generally to prohibit "discrimination in reverse"; and, finally, to make
the OFCC abide by section 703(a), which rendered preferential treat-
96. See commentary to subsec. (d) following 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2164.
Some commentators contend, however, that although affirmative action provisions were con-
tained in the Act during that time, they had never actually been utilized. Hence, according to
these writers, the idea that Congress implicitly approved such preferential relief is spurious. Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, the Comptroller General concluded that the Philadelphia Plan was
in conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
[While the phrase "affirmative action" was included in the Executive order (10925),
which was in effect at the time Congress was debating the bills which were subsequently
enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, no specific affirmative action requirements of the
kind here involved had been imposed upon contractors under authority of that Executive
order at that time, and we therefore do not think it can be successfully contended that
Congress, in recognizing the existence of the Executive order and in failing to specially
legislate against it, was approving or ratifying the type or methods of affirmative action
which [the Department of Labor] now proposes to impose upon contractors.
49 Comp. Gen. 59, 70-71 (1969), quoted in Chicago Comment 735 n.68.
97. See note 57 supra.
98. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-l to 2000e-6,
2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16 to 2000e-17 (1976)).
99. See Chicago Comment 753-57.
100. See id. 754-57.
1284 [Vol. 78:1268
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,246
ment illegal.1t' Had these amendments been approved by Congress,
the nondiscrimination clause in Executive Order No. 11,246 could no
longer have directed remedies more stringent than those available
under Title VII. Moreover, unequivocal approval of the executive pro-
gram-which by this time very obviously employed affirmative ac-
tion-emerged in the debates.'0 2
The above discussion indicates that the alternative remedy pro-
vided by the executive order manifests presidential authority "at its
maximum," for the order was issued pursuant to "an express or implied
authorization of Congress."103 However, specific remedies granted
pursuant to the order, or interpretations of the order urged upon the
courts, may fly in the face of congressional intentions.'l 4 Given that
Congress has endorsed the executive order program but that the au-
thority of the executive is not unbounded, the standards imposed by
Youngstown must be applied to determine the effect of executive-cre-
ated employment rights.
III. THE APPLICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11,246 TO
SENIORITY RIGHTS
As previously demonstrated,0 5 the President can obtain the power
101. Section 703(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976)) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
102. See 118 CONG. REc. 3371-72 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("this amendment can be
read to bar enforcement of the Government contract compliance program .... I cannot believe
that the Senate would do that after all the votes we have taken in the past 2 or 3 years to continue
that program in full force and effect." Id. 3372); id. 3962, 3964 (remarks of Sen. Javits); Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 237 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 720
(1979) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) ("Congress has implicitly exempted the Executive Order from the
constraints of Title VII") (footnote omitted); United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553
F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978) ("the
debates surrounding the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 offer additional evidence of congressional
approval [of Exec. Order No. 11,246]"); Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 67, at 30 ("The Executive
Order received implied legislative approval during the consideration of the 1972 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964"); Note, Imposition ofAffirmative Action Obligations on Nonconsenting
Government Contractors, 91 HARV. L. REv. 506, 514 (1977) ("in 1972, [Congress] ratified the Exec-
utive Order program").
103. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 35 supra. Affirma-
tive action schemes such as the Philadelphia Plan, see note 59 supra, initially achieved their force
through congressional "inertia, indifference, or quiescence" that invited "measures on individual
presidential responsibility." 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Eventually, when Congress
examined its position on affirmative action requirements, the presidential authority to implement
such plans moved from Justice Jackson's second category into his first.
104. See text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
105. See text accompanying notes 34-54 supra.
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to issue an executive order from the expression or implication of a stat-
ute or the Constitution, from legislative expressions or implications, or
from congressional acquiescence.10 6 In light of these limitations and
the congressional expressions concerning employment discrimina-
tion,10 7 the crucial question concerns the extent of the President's au-
thority to grant retroactive relief from discrimination in seniority
agreements through Executive Order No. 11,246. The President's pro-
curement authority to establish "an economical and efficient system for
the procurement and supply of property and services"' 08 arguably gives
him the power "to assure utilization of all segments of society in the
available labor pool for government contractors ... ,to9 Under this
theory, by elevating the seniority of affected minority employees to
levels that they would have achieved absent the discrimination, the
President would be assuring a proper distribution of minorities in the
work force.'" 0
Interference with a bona fide seniority system through the execu-
tive order was approved in Contractors Association of Eastern Pen-
nyslvania v. Secretary of Labor,"' where the court observed that
federal construction contracts involved an area "in which discrimina-
tion in employment was most likely to affect the cost and the progress
of projects in which the federal government had both financial and
completion interests.""I2 Certainly, there is economic justification in
favor of enforcing affirmative action terms in government contracts)13
106. Although much authority of the executive lacks explicit statutory approval, there is typi-
cally implicit legislative acceptance of the President's action or a delegation of authority to the
President by the Constitution. Without any of these sources of executive authority, the order lacks
the foundation necessary to become law. But if the order, or any portion of it, is sufficiently sup-
ported by one or more of these sources, it should be sustained.
107. See text accompanying notes 60-104 supra.
108. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1976).
109. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 1977). See note 24 supra.
Professor St. Antoine observes that minorities are severely underrepresented in the current labor
pool. They are "twice as likely as whites not to have jobs" and they "occupy a disproportionately
low percentage of the more attractive positions." St. Antoine, supra note 24, at 28-29.
110. One convincing argument against allowing the President to provide retroactive seniority
relief to minority workers is that such a directive would represent the imposition of his particular
notions of desirable social legislation and would reflect a policy that is neither economically neces-
sary nor advisable. See Miller, supra note 57, at 37-43. But see Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
111. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
112. 442 F.2d at 171.
113. In 1955 a study determined that the annual cost of discrimination is approximately $30
billion per year in unutilized skills and in markets lost through failure to spread purchasing power
to minorities. See Pasley, supra note 24, at 867-68. Justice Marshall stated in Teamsters that "the
backers of Title [VII] viewed economic equality as both a practical necessity and a moral impera.
five." 431 U.S. at 388 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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But even if the executive order's broad remedial measures are viewed
as an abuse of the procurement authority, the evidence that Congress
has acquiesced to or approved the sort of seniority relief requested in
East Texas Motor Freight provides an alternative source of executive
authority. 114
Although Congress never expressly approved retroactive seniority
relief through the executive order, it has endorsed affirmative action
schemes of the same magnitude." 5 Moreover, it is not necessary that
"congressional ratification of the particular aspect of the Executive Or-
der program. . . at issue"'1 16 be demonstrated, especially if a congres-
sional attitude can be discerned." 7 Such an attitude does surface in the
rejection of the proposed amendments to the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972.118 Implicit congressional approval of the Phila-
delphia Plan' 119 -which required that employers submit a statement of
"goals" of minority employment when submitting bids120 and which
was interpreted as mandating interference with "bona fide" seniority
systems'12 1-invited "measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity 22 to eradicate the vestiges of past discrimination through affirma-
tive action programs. In view of this implication and of the absence of
any congressional prohibition, the President could lawfully make fed-
eral contractors accede to affirmative action plans granting minority
workers retroactive seniority relief.'2 3
114. See text accompanying notes 41-59 supra.
115. See Chicago Comment 747-50. See notes 59 & 103 supra.
116. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978). The New Orleans court applied the order,
notwithstanding that Congress had not ratified the aspect of the program at issue.
117. A court can effectively "interpolate" from congressional expression the general character
of relief that the legislature would allow. By endorsing the Philadelphia Plan, see note 59 supra,
for example, Congress suggested that it would assent to similar policies.
118. See text accompanying note 99-102 supra.
119. See Chicago Comment 747-50. See notes 59 & 103 supra.
120. See note 59 supra.
121. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (plaintiffs contention).
122. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). The tacit approval of Congress
elicits other similar-and perhaps more controversial-actions by the President in the area of
employment discrimination.
123. Such plans apparently would not involve any constitutionally prohibited brand of "re-
verse discrimination." Affirmative action schemes are not unconstitutional where such racial pref-
erences serve "a compelling governmental interest and are the least drastic means of
accomplishing an appropriate end." St. Antoine, supra note 24, at 35. See generally Note, A
Proposal for Reconciling Af imative Action with Nondiscrimination Under the Contractor Antidis-
crimination Program, 30 STAN. L. REV. 803 (1977). Where "preferential treatment is a necessary
step toward a more fully integrated work force and toward genuine equality of employment op-
portunity, then no constitutional barriers should stand in the way." St. Antoine, supra note 24, at
35.
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While the remedy of granting retroactive seniority is appropriate,
it is easy to posit an abuse of presidential discretion under the order.
For example, if instead of directing prospective relief through retroac-
tive seniority a President demanded the immediate demotion of whites
and the advancement of minorities, three formidable attacks could be
launched. First, it is not apparent that such a remedy is reasonably
related to the procurement authority. 4 Second, even if economic ad-
vantages could be claimed, such a remedy is not analogous to any
schemes that Congress has expressly or implicitly authorized. 25 Thus,
no congressional support is manifested. Finally, whereas there had
been signs of legislative acquiescence to the granting of retroactive se-
niority, such "inaction" would undoubtedly instantaneously be trans-
ferred into congressional outrage, thus invalidating the implied
authority.
However, where the effect of the remedy is not so severe as to trig-
Apparently, the recent decision in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733
(1978), does not proscribe the preferential treatment afforded minorities under Executive Order
No. 11,246. Only Justice Powell reached the conclusion that the quota system employed by the
university was constitutionally infirm because it denied nonminority applicants equal protection
in the context of an educational system. Four other justices (who, with Powell, formed the major-
ity that upheld the decision of the California Supreme Court) held that the university had violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which was not applicable in East Texas Motor Freight. Interest-
ingly, however, the four justices who did not agree that the special admissions program was un-
lawful noted the scope of Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246, lending further support to the
view that the order is not limited by the statute and that it may provide broad relief:
In 1965, the President issued Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319, as amended 32
Fed. Reg. 14303, which required federal contractors to take affirmative action to remedy
the disproportionately low employment of racial minorities in the construction industry.
The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that the race consciousness required
by Executive Order 11246 did not conflict with Title VII:
"It is not correct to say that Title VII prohibits employers from making race or
national origin a factor for consideration at any stage in the process of obtaining
employees. The legal definition of discrimination is an evolving one, but it is now
well recognized in judicial opinions that the obligation of nondiscrimination,
whether imposed by statute or by the Constitution, does not require and, in some
circumstances, may not permit obliviousness or indifference to the racial conse-
quences of alternative courses of action which involve the application of outwardly
neutral criteria."
[42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 37, at 7 (1969).]
The federal courts agreed .... Moreover, Congress, in enacting the 1972 amendments
to Title VII, explicitly considered and rejected proposals to alter Executive Order 11246
and the prevailing judicial interpretations of Title VII as permitting, and in some cir-
cumstances requiring, race conscious action.
98 S. Ct. at 2781 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. The argument for enforcing the seniority rights of minorities, if based upon the presiden-
tial procurement power, is that such a policy will provide utilization of all segments of society in
the labor pool. The demotion of whites would be contrary to this aim.
125. It is very clear from congressional expressions in both 1964 and 1972 that demotion of
whites to enforce minority rights is disfavored. See, e.g., Vaas, supra note 64, at 450. It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that relieving discrimination in a "bona fide system" does not demand
such drastic remedies as demotion of nonminorities.
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ger congressional disapproval, congressional acquiescence further
strengthens the remedy. The courts have in fact been willing to give
effect to the requirements of nondiscrimination mandated by the order
in situations closely analogous to that presented by the claimants in
East Texas Motor Freight. In Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit upheld executive interference with
bona fide seniority systems, noting "that § 703(h) is a limitation only
upon Title VII."'12 6 A recent district court cas127 squared this position
with Teamsters: "Teamsters did not in any sense indicate that retroac-
tive seniority would violate the Act. . . .Title VII is intended to gov-
em only private contracts, and not contracts with the government."1 28
Indeed, the notable absence of any mention of Contractors Association
of Eastern Pennsylvania by the Teamsters Court suggests that the
Teamsters decision imposed a limitation only upon Title VII. The
Court sought to give effect to congressional sentiment that the Act
should not violate seniority "expectations" which had developed prior
to its enactment.' 29 By using the "expectation analysis," the Court rec-
ognized that government contractors should have anticipated the em-
ployment of affirmative action schemes since they expressly agreed to a
clause that makes affirmative action possible. Hence, because govern-
ment contractors possess no justification for expecting that pre-Act dis-
crimination is immunized, the Court narrowed its consideration to that
category of employers that did not contract with the government and
justifiably expected the application only of Title VII. Therefore, the
less burdensome requirements of Title VII applied to the defendants in
Teamsters. Both judicial interpretations and congressional expressions
supply ample rationale for allowing the executive order to direct retro-
active seniority relief.
IV. THE DECISION IN East Texas Motor Freight
Given that under Executive Order No. 11,246 the President can
lawfully direct retroactive seniority relief, the final question is whether
the Fifth Circuit in East Texas Motor Freight properly rejected claims
for such relief. The court rejected application of the executive order on
several grounds: first, that no action can be taken under the executive
order against a labor union unless the union is "engaged in work under
government contracts," which the union in East Texas Motor Freight
126. 442 F.2d at 172.
127. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1977).
128. Id. at 1121.
129. 431 U.S. at 352-54.
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was not;' 31 second, that even if an action could be brought against the
union, the only action authorized would be through Title VII, which
under Teamsters could not apply;' 3' third, that although section
209(a)(2) of the order speaks of enjoining "organizations" that "prevent
compliance with the provisions of the order," the only action available
would be the enforcement of contract provisions, which would not in-
clude the awarding of retroactive seniority relief;' 32 and, finally, that
even if authorization of a remedial action against the union were con-
tained in the order, a bona fide seniority system is lawful.' 33 These
conclusions demonstrate either the court's misreading of or its disre-
gard for the executive order, congressional intent and recent case law.
The court incorrectly stated that actions against unions may only
involve those unions "engaged in work under government contracts" 34
and that such relief must proceed through Title VII. 35 While such an
alternative is provided by the order, section 209(a)(2) apparently also
allows an action against unions involved in work under private
contracts.'36 An employer, such as East Texas Motor Freight, that is
engaged in any amount of work under a government contract agrees to
take affirmative action to assure that no discrimination will exist at any
of itsfaciliies37 in the areas of "upgrading, demotion, or transfer;...
layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation
.... "38 In other words, all employment, whether involved in the ful-
fillment of either government or private contracts, is subject to the
terms of the executive order. In East Texas Motor Freight the union
had stepped into the shoes of the employer, since the company under a
consent decree had left the seniority provisions in the union agreement
for resolution between the United States and the union.13 9 Hence, the
union could properly be brought under the language of section
209(a)(2) as an "organization" that seeks "to prevent directly or indi-
130. 564 F.2d at 184.
131. Id.
132. Id. The court hinted that the only remedy available to the government would be to
enforce contract provisions by way of damages or an injunction. Id.
133. Id. at 185.
134. Id. at 184 (quoting § 209(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation)).
135. 564 F.2d at 184.
136. See text accompanying notes 139-43 infra.
137. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 204, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976).
138. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976).
139. 564 F.2d at 181 ("The consent decree settled all issues between the United States and
[East Texas]. . . . It did not affect seniority provisions of union agreements but left these for
resolution after trial of the issues between the United States and the Union").
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rectly compliance" with the executive order,"4 even though the union
itself was not engaged in work under government contracts.
As the court noted in Joyce v. McCrane,14 1 in holding that the af-
firmative action requirements of the executive order apply with equal
force to employers and unions,
[in] any matter that deals with the regulation of this work force the
unions must be proper parties. To rule otherwise would defeat the
intention of Executive Order No. 11246, in that the government
could bind the contractors to affirmative action yet this would be
meaningless as the contractors could contract away this obligation
through collective bargaining agreements with the unions.' 42
Thus, the union in East Texas Motor Freight is covered by the order
because the government can demand, pursuant to its contract with the
employer, that affirmative action be undertaken to eliminate discrimi-
nation arising from facially neutral seniority provisions. 143
The East Texas Motor Freight court also held that even if an ac-
tion against the union were appropriate, "it would necessarily be an
action to enforce contract provisions by way of damages or an injunc-
tion."1  The court added that "nothing in the Order suggests any au-
thority to direct retroactive seniority benefit[s].' 45 Such a restrictive
interpretation is supported neither by case law nor by the language of
the order. The explicit section 209(a)(2) remedy of enforcing contract
provisions encompasses broad equitable relief through its use of the
phrase "appropriate proceedings."' 14 6 In United States v. Duquesne
Light Co., 147 the court observed that "[b]y its reference to 'appropriate
proceedings,' § 209(a)(2) confers on the government discretion to in-
yoke the equitable powers of [the] Court." 4s Although nowhere in the
140. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976).
141. 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
142. Id. at 1291.
143. Clearly, the practice involved in East Texas Motor Freight presents a type of discrimina-
tion subject to the prohibitions of the order. Minorities were confined to the most undesirable jobs
for many years. If those employees subsequently transferred to better jobs, they forewent the
seniority status they acquired in their previous positions. By maintaining their more secure status
of seniority, the employees did not risk layoffs or loss of benefits as they would if they shifted to
the OTR jobs, yet they received less pay and were precluded from advancement. The discrimina-
tory effects of originally limiting minority workers to city lines were perpetuated through afaciali,
neutral seniority system. An entire generation of Negroes was frozen into "the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
144. 564 F.2d at 184.
145. Id.
146. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. following § 2000e (1976).
147. 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
148. Id. at 509.
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executive order or its accompanying regulations is a backpay order spe-
cifically mentioned, such relief was granted in Duquesne Light Co. as a
sanction available to "effectuate the purposes of the Order." 14 9 The
East Texas Motor Freight court in an effort to "effectuate the purposes
of the Order" could properly have directed retroactive seniority relief
against the union, an organization preventing contract compliance.
Finally, the court's statement that the executive order may not
defy the congressional policy enunciated in Title VII that bona fide
seniority systems are lawful is clearly without foundation.1 50 While it is
true that Congress has declared that a bona fide seniority system shall
be lawful,'' it has done so strictly within the confines of Title VII.
Significantly, although section 7030) provides that the Act does not re-
quire employers to grant "preferential treatment,"'52 and, according to
Senators Clark and Case, the Act is essentially colorblind, 53 Congress
in 1972 nevertheless approved the highly preferential Philadelphia Plan
and rejected an amendment that would have banned discrimination. 154
Although the East Texas Motor Freight court cited Youngstown in stat-
ing that the "Executive may not. . .[act] in defiance of [congressional]
policy,"' 5 5 a more careful consideration of both Youngstown and the
history of the executive order suggests that the relief requested in East
Texas Motor Freight could be lawfully granted on the basis of either
the outright approval or "benevolent acquiescence" of Congress. The
East Texas Motor Freight decision did not discuss the cases that have
declared the executive order a separate remedy from Title VII and the
Act t56-most notably, those cases in the area of seniority rights. 57 In
unnecessarily narrowing the scope of Executive Order No. 11,246, the
Fifth Circuit rejected an appropriate opportunity to afford relief
against discrimination in seniority agreements where Title VII had
been rendered ineffectual.
149. Id.
150. See text accompanying notes 93-102 supra.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
152. Id. § 2000e-20). Compare section 703(a), reprinted in part at note 101 supra, making
preferential treatment illegal.
153. See 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (1964).
154. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
155. 564 F.2d at 185.
156. Although several cases discuss the interplay of Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246,
see, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1977), the court
did not cite, much less discuss, any of them.
157. See Contractors Ass'n ofE. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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V. CONCLUSION
While most discriminatory acts are particularly vulnerable to stat-
utory prohibition, insidious discrimination that has its roots in chrono-
logically distant practices is less easily relieved. Seniority agreements
falling into the latter classification were apparently exempted from the
requirements of Title VII. However, in approving liberal readings of
the remedial authority of Executive Order No. 11,246, Congress invited
such "measures on individual presidential responsibility" which might
serve to eliminate discrimination created by ostensibly neutral seniority
provisions. At the very least, Congress has acquiesced in a policy de-
rived either from "independent" executive authority or from the presi-
dential procurement authority. In allowing the executive to set a wide
range of policies dealing with employment discrimination in federal
contracts, Congress has no doubt recognized that a different set of rules
must direct federal contractors and that there is ample economic and
political justification for holding these employers to a stricter standard
than that applied to those not doing business with the government.
Since seniority agreements that are prima facie neutral can be severely
discriminatory, the President should be able to grant retroactive senior-
ity relief to deserving minority employees based upon the affirmative
action clause in government contracts. If Congress subsequently voices
disapproval of this remedy, then it would not only have clarified the
presidential authority in this area, but would also have extinguished the
acquiescence that gave support to the executive exercise of power. Un-
til such disapproval is manifested, however, the courts should afford
Executive Order No. 11,246 the broad measure of remedial authority to
which it is entitled.
Gary W. Jackson
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